When Daddy Wants Out: The Issue of Paternity by Murphy, Jane C. & Levin, Cheri Wyron
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
2000
When Daddy Wants Out: The Issue of Paternity
Jane C. Murphy
University of Baltimore School of Law, jmurphy@ubalt.edu
Cheri Wyron Levin
University of Baltimore School of Law, clevin@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jane C. Murphy & Cheri Levin, When Daddy Wants Out: The Issue of Paternity, 33 Md. B.J. 10 (2000)
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688549
Published bimonthly by the 
Maryland State Bar Association, Inc. 
The Maryland Bar Center 
520 W. Fayette St. 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201 
Telephone: (410) 685-7878 
(800) 492-1964 
Web site: www.msba.org 
Executive Director - Paul V. Carlin 
Editor- Janet Stidman Eveleth 
Assistant to Editor - Ruth E. Ballard 
Design - Blue Sky Design 
Art Direction - Brian Michael Lawrence 
Advertising Sales - Network Publications 
Subscriptions: MSBA members receive THE 
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL as $20 of 
their dues payment goes to publication. 
Others, $42 per year. 
POSTMASTER: Send address change to 
THE MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL, 
520 W. Fayette St., Baltimore, MD 21201. 
The Manjlalld Bar Joumal welcomes articles on 
topics of interest to Maryland attorneys. All 
manuscripts must be original work, sub-
mitted for approval by the Special Conunit-
tee on Editorial Advisory, and must 
conform to the Joumal style guidelines, 
which are available from the MSBA head-
quarters. The Special Conunittee reserves 
the right to reject any manuscript submitted 
for publication. 
Advertising: Advertising rates will be furnished 
upon request. All advertiSing is subject to 
approval by the Editorial Advisory Board. 
Editorial Advisory Board 
EUzabeth M. Kameen, Chair 
Mimi Azrael 
Michael D. Berman 
Courtney Blair 
Ann Norman Bosse 
Timmerman Tepel Daugherty 
Marcella A. Holland 
Louise A. Lock 
Nancy J. Malir 
Victoria Henry Pepper 
A. Eric Peltosalo 
Mary Langdon Preis 
Association Officers (1999-2000) 
President- James L. Thompson 
President-Elect - Richard H. Sothoron, Jr. 
Secretary- James P. Nolan 
Treasurer - Harry S. ]olu1Son 
ETHICS HOTLINE 
MARCH2000 
Steven Rosen 
(301) 699-1400 
ThomasA. Wade 
(301) 733-6644 
Richard Bardos 
(410) 576--6533 
APRIL2000 
Coleen Clemente 
(410) 848-9151 
Thomas E. Lynch, TIl 
(301)698-2304 
Hon. Joan Gordon 
Prince George's 
Washington 
Baltimore City 
Carroll 
Frederick 
J,.1.1Q)J2~i19~ , .... ,. _ Baltimore 
W' "'LJ .." UCL,. IllUI Q 
~aw_! ibrary' ./ 
XXXIII • Number 2 Marchi April 2000 
Features Tne MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL and its edrtor Jane! SNdman Eveleth. hove been hOr"lc red with a Luminary Awo~d for Excellence in Publications by the Notiona l 
Association of Bar Executives Communication Section. 
WHAT ABOUT THE CHILDREN?? 
What About Me? The Child's Voice In Court 
by Ann N. Sundt 
When Daddy Wants Out: The Issue Of Paternity 
by Jane C. Murphy and Cheri Wyron Levin 
Representing Children In Custody Disputes 
by Susan Carol Elgin 
Family Court - An Investment In The Future 
by Janet Stidman Eveleth 
Children: Wards Or Waifs Of The Court? 
by Susan Leviton 
Adoption In Maryland 
by Natalie H. Rees 
Laws Protecting Children With Special Needs 
by EllenA. Callegary and Abigail F. Cohen 
I Don't Want To Grow Up - The Age Of Majority 
by Eric Peltosalo 
Children'S Rights In Medical Decision-Making 
by Catherine M. Brennan 
Deceptive AdvertiSing Cases 
by W. Lawrence Westcott II 
Departments 
Attorney Grievance Commission 
Unhappy Complainants - Justified or Unjustified - Part One 
Ethics Docket 
Client's Refusal to Pay Out-of-Pocket Costs 
2 
10 
16 
22 
28 
34 
38 
42 
48 
54 
58 
59 
Statements or opinions expressed herein are those of the a\lthors and db fiot ne>essaij.ly refleci thoSf 01 th\,.Marylan~ Sl;iite,&l'A~s6- :': 
ciahon, its officers, Board of Govemors, the Editorial Boord or staff. Publishingan advertis~me~t 'l.9<"i I)!!>J llnply endo~e~en't,~f any .. 
product or servlceoffered . :; :: :.- . ~ ". .;. .. ~"~ oJ ~ ;;" 1/ F r ~ 
All photography by Eve Morra '. 1 of f:' (~ .. i, I ,;p;?:",~.,. ~\..' 
erhaps you've seen the signs along a nwnber of ma-
jor highways in Maryland. A pregnant Mona Lisa 
advertising a DNA testing company with the cap-
tion 'Who's the Daddy?" With the rise in the nwn-
ber of children born out of wedlock in Maryland in 
the last several decades, paternity testing is be-
coming routine and family law practitioners are 
handling more cases in which the father or moth-
er or both are trying to change who is named as the legal father in a 
paternity or divorce judgment. The law governing such cases has 
changed substantially since 1995. This article will guide the practi-
tioner through the changes in the law, describe the need for sepa-
rate representation of children in many of these cases and provide 
guidance on effective representation of children in paternity modifi-
cation proceedings. 
Background 
In 1994, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a widely publicized 
decision that required two men to make child support payments for 
children they did not father. Although many lawyers and a few judges 
commented at the time that the ruling both defied common sense and 
was WljUSt, the decision reaffirmed well-established legal principles 
on the finality of judgments. Tandra S. v. Tyrone W, 336 Md. 303 (1994) 
involved a consolidated appeal of two patemity cases in which blood 
tests, performed years after the judgments were entered, excluded 
the legal fathers. In reversing the trial courts' orders reopening the pa-
ternity judgnlents, the Court of Appeals ruled that an order declar-
ing paternity was a final judgment subject to revision only in the 
manner and to the extent that any order is subject to the revisory pow-
er of the court. Under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) there must be clear and 
convincing evidence of fraud, mistake or irregularity before the judg-
ment can be vacated. 
Shortly after the court's decision in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W , the Gen-
eral Assembly modified Title 5, subtitle 10 of the Fan1ily Law Article, 
which is generally used to determin.e paternity of a child born out of 
wedlock for purposes of establishing responsibility for the support of 
that child. The statute now provides in pertinent part that " A decla-
ration of paternity may be ... set aside ... if a blood or genetic test done 
in accordance with §5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of 
Ms. Murphy is a Professor of Law and Ms. Levin an Adjunct Professor of Law, 
with the University of Baltinwre ScJwol of Law. 
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the individual named as father in this order. Family Law Article, §5-
1038(a)(2). The Code also contains a second paternity provision, Es-
tates and Trust Article, §1-208, which permits an equity court to 
determine the paternity of a child. This provision is typically used to 
determine paternity for purposes of inheritance, but has also been 
deemed the preferred procedure for other situations that arise, such 
as when two men claim paternity of the same child, Turner v. Whisted, 
327 Md. 106 (1992), or where a woman challenges the paternity of her 
husband of a child born during their marriage, Monroe v. Monroe, 
329 Md. 758 (1993). The latter type of proceeding is affected by the 1995 
amendments only to the extent that §208(b)(1) of the States and Trusts 
Article incorporates prior judicial determinations of paternity as a 
method of demonstrating paternity. 
At the time the legislation was enacted there was very little de-
bate. The only opposition to the bills came from the lawyers and agen-
cies entrusted with enforcing the child support laws. The increasing 
cost of governmental support for children had led, in the 1980s and 
1990s, to a variety of legislative mechanisms to find absent fathers. The 
child support enforcement bureaucracy saw §5-1038(a)(2) as a po-
tential obstacle to establishing paternity and collecting child sup-
port. Despite these concerns, the law passed easily in 1995. 
Section 5-1038(a)(2) left a couple of questions open. Does the abili-
ty to modify apply to declarations of paternity in divorce judgments? 
Typically, these findings are nothing more than recitals, based upon 
the parties' pleadings and/ or testimony tha t certain named children 
were born of the marriage. Custody may be awarded and support may 
be ordered, but in the usual case the children's paternity is not actu-
ally litigated. Are such findings "declarations of paternity" within the 
meaning of §5-1038(a) subject to reopening or do the traditional preclu-
sion doctrines - res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, sin-
gle controversy - apply to paternity findings in divorce decrees? 
Another question left open by §5-1038 is whether setting aside or 
modifying a declaration of paternity entitles the individual who had 
been named as the father in the order to recover past payments or be 
relieved of arrearages? Here the answer seems much clearer. Both 
Maryland and federal law bar retroactive modification of child sup-
port orders, Family Law Article, §12-104; 42 U.s.c. §666(a)(9), and this 
authority has been held to bar recovery of child support paid under 
a judgment of paternity that is subsequently vacated. Monroe County 
Department oj Social Services, 609 NYS.2d 762 (1994); cj, Krikstan v. Krik-
stan, 90 Md. App. 473, (1992). 
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Need for Separate Representation of 
Children 
Since the enactment of the amend-
ments, petitions to vacate or modify pa-
ternity judgments have been quietly filed 
throughout the state. The question of 
when a child needs separate legal repre-
sentation from his or her parents is the 
subject of much debate and many law 
review articles. Some have argued that 
children have a constitutional right to rep-
resentation in any proceeding in which 
the ability to maintain a custodial or le-
gal relationship with a parent is at issue. 
While the argument that a drild has a 
liberty interest in the identity of his or her 
legal father has not been established in 
Maryland, there are some signs that such 
an argument might prevail. The Court of 
Appeals has recently heard arguments 
in a case in which the Court of Special 
Appeals found a constitutional right for 
children to participate in termination of 
parental rights cases where parents have 
defaulted or consented. In re Adoption/ 
Guardianship No. 62970003, 127 Md. App. 
33 (1999); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
T97036005 and In re Adoption/Guardian-
ship No. T98097012 (argued Sept. 30, 
1999). 
The impetus for providing separate 
representation for children, then, must 
be grounded in statutory law. Although 
there is a statutory mandate for separate 
representation of a child in Child In Need 
of Assistance cases (Courts & Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article, §3-821), the decision to 
appoint an attorney in a contested cus-
tody, visitation or child support case is 
discretionary. Family Law Article, §1-202. 
Because reopening paternity judgments 
will necessarily affect the obligation to 
pay child support, §1-202 provides the 
court with discretionary authority to ap-
pointan attorney in these proceedings if 
the court chooses to exercise its discre-
tion on the motion of one of the parties 
or on its own motion. 
Despite the regular practice of ap-
pointing attorneys in contested custody 
cases, a survey of the largest jurisdictions 
in Maryland reveals that, with the ex-
ception of Baltimore City, courts rarely 
appoint attorneys for children in pater-
nity modification proceedings. Judges 
and lawyers in these cases apparently as-
sume that either the child has no inde-
pendent _ interest in changing or 
preserving a paternity judgment or, what-
ever the child's interests are, those inter-
ests are represented by the state or the 
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mother (who is often unrepresented by 
counsel). 
Our experience has demonstrated that 
in these cases,like custody cases, the in-
terests of the adults may not be the same 
as the child's. For example, in many cas-
es the mother is willing to agree to vacate 
the paternity judgment. Even if she be-
lieves the legal father is the biological fa-
ther, she may not be interested in any 
support from him. She has supported the 
child herself ·without any help from the 
legal father or is not likely to receive his 
support because the state has provided 
benefits. 
In other cases where there is genuine 
doubt as to the legal father's biological 
link, she may agree it is only fair to let the 
legal father "off the hook," or she may 
believe the legal father voluntarily be-
came the "psychological father" to the 
child but the legal father may have in-
timidated or regularly harassed the moth-
er about "setting the record straight." The 
mother may acquiesce under pressure 
from the legal father or because she feels 
she and her child would be better off 
without the negative presence of the le-
gal father. 
The child, on the other hand, may have 
an interest in preserving the paternity de-
cree, even if there is no biological link. In 
cases where no other father is likely to be 
identified or established legally, the child 
may be rendered fatherless by the pro-
ceeding. This may result in emotional 
harm where some emotional attachment 
to the legal father has been established. 
In addition, given the loss of the right to 
support, governmental benefits and the 
right to inherit, the child may also suf-
fer financial harm from vacating the 
paternity decree. In these circumstances, 
appointing separate counsel for the child 
would provide a "voice" for the child in 
the proceeding. As the Court of Special 
Appeals stated in the custody context: 
We are most concerned that a five-
year-old child has been the subject 
of litigation for over on-fourth of his 
life and has yet to see an end to it. 
We are also concerned that during 
the four days of testimony before the 
Master, the Master never spoke to 
the child, never heard from a truly 
objective witness and did not have 
the input of someone who would 
speak on behalf of the child. Since 
no other testimony was offered, the 
hearing before the Chancellor suf-
fered from the same deficiency. This 
deficiency should be remedied by 
our direction that separate counsel 
be appointed for [the child]. 
The potential adverse consequences of 
failing to appoint an attorney for the child 
in proceedings brought under §5-1038 
(a)(2) were demonstrated in the recent 
Court of Special Appeals decision in Ty-
rone W. v. Danielle R., et al., 1999 WL 
1085663 (Md. App. filed Dec. 3, 1999). In 
that case, the court reviewed a trial court 
decision involving the same putative fa-
ther, Tyrone Wilson, who was before the 
Court of Appeals in the 1994 case Tandra 
S. v. Tyrone W. In the 1999 case, the court 
interpreted the 1995 amendment to §5-
1038 and held that Mr. Wilson is entitled 
to genetic testing to determine if he is the 
biological father of a ten-year-old boy. 
The child was not represented before ei-
ther the trial or appellate courts. Without 
any discussion of whether the taking of 
blood tests would be in the best interest 
of the child, the court held that: 
[Bly amending FL. §5-1038(a) as it 
did in 1995, the Legislature intended 
that blood or genetic testing under 
F.L. §5-1029 not only may be re-
quested by an alleged father, and 
upon such request shall be ordered, 
before a declaration of paternity, but 
also may be requested by an ad-
judged father, and upon such re-
quest shall be ordered, after a 
declaration of paternity, upon a pre-
liminary showing of good cause to 
believe that the requested tests will 
establish the necessary factual pred-
icate for the court to exercise its 
revisory power under F.L. 
§1038(a)(2)(i)(2). 
Id. at 19. 
The court further found that good 
cause was satisfied in this case by Mr. 
Wilson's testimony that he believed the 
mother had a sexual relationship with 
another man at the time of the child's con-
ception. TIle mother testified that the re-
lationship was at a different time and she 
was "positive that Tyrone is T.R's bio-
logical father." Id. at 6. Apart from a ref-
erence to the adjudged fathers claim that 
he and the child were not close, there was 
no discussion of the impact of the blood 
tests on the child. If the child in that case 
had been represented, counsel could have 
developed both factual and legal bases 
for application of the appropriate stan-
dards - best interests of the child - for 
determining whether blood tests should 
have been ordered. 
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The Role of the Child's Attorney 
Once an attorney has been appointed, 
a number of issues may arise that are 
common to other contexts in which the 
client is a child. First, attorneys should 
make certain that the order appointing 
them clarifies the role the attorney is to 
play in the case. Attorneys representing 
children can be appointed as advocates 
for the child's position or to represent 
what they believe to be the best interests 
of the child or to waive the child's right 
to confidentiality under the Nagle v. Hooks 
doctrine or any combination of these 
three roles. Paternity decisions do not in-
volve the child's preference in the same 
way as custody cases. The courts, there-
fore, are most likely to appoint attorneys 
to represent the best interests of the child 
rather than the child's advocate. In any 
event, counsel should make certain that 
they are not ordered to undertake po-
tentially conflicting roles. 
Other ethical issues that may confront 
the child's attorney relate to the attorney's 
obligation to obtain information from and 
provide information to the child client. 
The child's young age or, in the case of 
MARYLAND BAR JOURNAL 
older children, the attorney's concern 
about potential emotional trauma from 
learning about the putative father's effort 
to terminate the relationship may make 
it impossible to fully inform the child 
client about the case. Maryland's Rules 
of Professional conduct recognize the spe-
cial circumstances that exist when the 
client is a child. The comment to Rule 1.4, 
which governs the lawyer's obligation to 
communicate with his client, notes that 
"ordinarily the information to be pro-
vided is that appropriate for a client who 
is a comprehending and responsible 
adult. 
However, fully informing the client ac-
cording to this standard may be imprac-
ticable ... where the client is a child." The 
Comments to Rule 1.14 which deals with 
clients under a disability cautions that 
"when the client is a minor ... maintaining 
the ordinary client-lawyer relationship 
may not be possible in all respects." Thus 
the rules support the attorney's decision 
in a paternity case not to interview a child 
who is either too young or too vulnera-
ble to discuss the specifics of the case. 
Once you have been appointed to be 
u 
the best interest attorney, your task is to 
formulate a recommendation to the court 
about whether reopening the paternity 
decree will be in the best interest of your 
client. It may seem obvious that your rec-
ommendation will be based on the best 
interests of the child since you were ap-
pointed to be the best interest attorney. 
However, as discussed above, the best 
interest attorney designation defines the 
role of the attorney, whereas the best in-
terest of the child standard that we be-
lieve the court should apply in cases 
brought under §5-1038(a) al'lO defines the 
role of the court. 
The Best Interests of the Child 
In Maryland, the best interest of the 
child standard has been consistently used 
by the courts in a variety of matters in-
volving children. For example, the best 
interest of the child standard has been ap-
plied in cases involving custody of chil-
dren,Ross v.Hoffinan,280 Md. 172 (1977); 
joint custody of children, Taylor v. Taylor, 
306 Md. 290 (1985); visitation by parents, 
North v. North, 102 Md. App.1 (1994); vis-
itation by grandparents, Fairbanks v. Mc-
e! 
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Carter, 330 Md. 39 (1993); modification of 
provisions concerning child care and 
maintenance in separation agreements, 
Heinmuller v. Heimnuller, 257 Md. 672 
(1970); adoptions of children, In re Adop-
tion/Guardianship No. 10941,335 Md. 99 
(1994); and, in two cases closely related 
to reopening a paternity decree, a request 
to establish paternity, Sider v. Sider, 334 
Md. 512 (1994) and a request for a blood 
test, Turnerv. Whisted,327Md.106(1991). 
Turner involved two men, each claiming 
to be the father of the child in question. 
The court suggested the possibility that 
the trial court appoint counsel to repre-
sent the child's interest if the court be-
lieved that a blood test might be contrary 
to the child's best interest. In addition, the 
court in Turner described the facts that 
the court should consider when it deter-
mines what is in the child's best interest 
in cases of disputed paternity.ld. at 116. 
However, the Court of Special Appeals 
did not apply the best interest of the child 
standard in determining whether to order 
blood tests in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R, et 
al., a case in which, as discussed above, 
the child was not represented by counsel 
at trial or on appeal. Perhaps when this 
issue reaches the Court of Appeals, the 
Court will direct the lower courts to ap-
ply the best interest of the child standard. 
In the meantime, counsel for the child 
should argue that the best interest of the 
child standard governs the court's deci-
sions in all issues in disputed paternity 
cases, including the decision whether to 
order blood tests. 
Investigating the Facts 
One of the most important and poten-
tially time-consuming activities involved 
in representing children in cases involving 
efforts to reopen paternity judgments is 
conducting the factual investigation. As 
counsel for the child, you must obtain as 
complete a picture as possible of the 
child's life, needs, relationships, feelings 
and future possibilities in order to assess 
what is in the child's best interest. 
In our experience, the factual scenario 
that most often supports the reopening 
of a paternity decree is where there is 
someone other than the legal father who 
either has assumed the role of father to 
the child and has been supporting the 
child financially and emotionally, or who 
wants to assume that role. This individ-
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ual may be the true biological father, a 
stepfather, or even someone else. 
However, in most cases, particularly 
those involving older children, there will 
not be anyone "waiting in the wings" to 
be the child's father. This makes the as-
sessment of what would be in the child's 
best interest more complicated. You will 
need to investigate the child's physical, 
mental and emotional needs, the child's 
past relationship with the legal father and 
particularly whether the child has formed 
an attachment to the legal father; the sta-
bility of the child's family and home en-
vironment; and any other facts that affects 
the child's well-being. 
Would reopening and vacating the pa-
ternity decree leave the child fatherless 
for life, with the attendant loss of child 
support, inheritance rights, and other ben-
efits? Does the child have an emotional 
attachment to the legal father that would 
be destroyed by vacating the paternity de-
cree? Does the child have problems that 
would be exacerbated by finding out that 
the only father she has ever known does 
not want to be her father anymore? Ob-
violl.o;;ly each case is different and unique, 
but these are some of the difficult and 
troubling questions that you must pon-
der when determining best interests. 
There are various sources of informa-
tion that will help you in your investiga-
tion. At the outset, you probably will not 
have much information about the case. 
The court order appointing you to rep-
resent the child will most likely be ac-
companied by only the most recent 
pleadings filed in the case. Those plead-
ings will vary depending on who initiat-
ed the most recent controversy. 
Although there can be a variety of fact 
patterns, the two most common are ei-
ther that the state is seeking child support 
arrearages from the legal father and he 
answers with a denial of paternity and a 
request to reopen the paternity decree, or 
that the legal father has initiated the pro-
ceeding by filing a request to reopen the 
paternity decree. 
The court file often is a good source of 
background information. The file not only 
contains the history of the entire case, in-
cluding all of the pleadings, but it also 
might contain other helpful documents 
such as correspondence, court orders and 
case notes. Basic information such as ad-
dresses, birth dates and social security 
numbers might also be in the court file 
and could prove helpful in locating wit-
ness and obtaining documents. 
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You should also contact the child's cus-
todian early in the process. The custodian 
is often the child's natural mother, but the 
custodian might be a grandparent, another 
relative or a third party. The custodian can 
not only provide you with information 
about the child, but at the outset, the cus-
todian can help evaluate whether you can 
and should talk to the child. 
The initial interview with the child's 
mother or other custodian, and the child, 
where prudent, will provide leads for fur-
ther investigation. Relatives are fertile 
sources of information, particularly ma-
ternal and sometimes paternal grand-
parents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Other 
sources of information might include pro-
fessionals involved in the child's life, such 
as teachers and friends of the family. 
You should also consider getting in-
formation from the legal father or, if 
represented, from his attorney. Either in-
formal interviews or formal discovery, 
such as depositions, are possibilities. 
As in any case involving a determina-
tion of a child's best interest, it might be 
helpfut depending on the facts of the 
case, to obtain the assistance of an expert 
witness to help counsel determine what 
is in the child's best interests. For exam-
ple, a psychologist or psychiatrist might 
. be able to shed light on the child's men-
tal and emotional state and the effect that 
reopening or vacating might have on the 
child. Likewise, if the child has medical 
problems, the child's doctor might be able 
to determine the effect of reopening on 
the child's physical condition. Cost is a 
potential impediment to the use of an ex-
pert witness, but reduced fees or pro bona 
assistance might be available. 
The Legal Arguments 
In addition to the facts supporting the 
best interest argument, the legal argu-
ments discussed below might help sup-
port your recommendation. 
Section 5-1038(a) became effective on 
October I, 1995.1£ the paternity judgment 
in question was entered prior to October 
1,1995 there is an issue as to whether §5-
1032(a) can be applied retroactively to 
that judgment. Several circuit court 
judges in Baltimore Gty have applied §5-
l038(a) retroactively and at least one cir-
cuit court judge, sitting in Baltimore Gty, 
decided in a written, unreported decision 
that §5-1038(a) could not be applied 
retroactively. Bnrum v. Nichols, No. PD39-
6761 (Dec. 3, 1996). 
The Court of Special Appeals recently 
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held in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., et al., that 
the 1995 amendment to §5-1038(a) can be 
applied retroactively on the theory that it 
is remedial in nature and does not affect 
vested rights. However, sound arguments 
can be made thatthe statute should not 
be applied retroactively and the L<;sue has 
not yet come before the Court of Appeals. 
1£ you have concluded that it is not in 
the best interest of the child to reopen a 
paternity decree entered prior to October 
1,1995 you may want to argue that the 
statute should not be applied retroac-
tively. The general rule concerning 
retroactive application of a statute in 
Maryland is that a statute is presumed to 
apply prospectively only unless there is 
a clear legislative intent that the statute 
apply retroactively. WSSC v. Riverdale Fire 
Co., 308 Md. 556, 60-61 (1987). Thus, as-
certaining the intent of the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly is the key to theretroactivity 
arguments. 
It can be argued that since the language 
of §5-1 038(a) is silent as to its application, 
it shows no legislative intent that the 
statute be applied retroactively. Likewise, 
the legislative history contains no indica-
tion that the General Assembly intended 
the statute to apply retroactively. Thus, it 
can be argued, without legislative intent 
to the contrary, the statute must be pre-
sumed to apply prospectively only. 
Whether a statute can be applied 
retroactively may depend on what type 
of rights it affects. 1£ a statute affects only 
procedural rights, and not substantive or 
vested rights, then the statute can be ap-
plied retroactively absent contrary leg-
islative intent. Richardson v. Richardson, 
217 Md. 316, 320 (1958). It can be argued 
that a child's rights to support, inheritance 
and other benefits are vested rights that 
would be affected by the retroactive ap-
plication of the statute. 
The paternity judgments that are sub-
ject to reopening are final, non-appealable 
judgments. Retroactive application of a 
legislative enactment that allows the re-
opening of a final judgment by the judi-
ciary may violate the separation of powers 
doctrine by "encroaching on core judicial 
power." Ex Parte Jenkins, 723 S .. 2d 649, 656 
(Ala. 1998). The basis for this potential vi-
olation is the notion that the law concern-
ing when a final judgment may be 
reopened that was applicable at the tim.e 
the judgment became final is part of the 
judgment itself and cannot be later 
changed. However, the fact that the court's 
authority to reopen a paternity decree un-
der §5-1038(a) is discretionary rather than 
mandatory may make the separation of 
powers argument less persuasive. 
Section 5-1038(a)(2)(ii) specifically pro-
hibits the modification or setting aside of 
a declaration of paternity if the "individ-
ual named in the order acknowledged pa-
ternity knowing he was not the father." 
The knowledge of the father is a factual 
issue that must be proven at trial and, if 
proven, may prevent the reopening of a 
paternity decree. 
There is some question as to the con-
stitutionality of the statute. As noted 
above, if the statute applies only to dec-
larations of paternity for illegitimate chil-
dren and not to declarations of paternity 
for legitimate children in divorce decrees, 
then there is a potential equal protection 
argument. Although the constitutionali-
ty of the statute has been raised at the tri-
al court level in Maryland, there have been 
no rulings on its constitutionality. 
Counsel's Recommendation 
Once you have decided what is in the 
child's best interest, you need to write a re-
port to the court describing your recom-
mendation and the facts and law that 
support that recommendation. TIris report 
should be tail<;>red to the specifics of each 
case and might include a recitation of the 
procedural history of the case, a descrip-
tion of counsel's methodology in conduct-
ing the factual investigation, a summary of 
the facts learned from the investigation and 
the sources of those facts, and an analysis 
of the facts that support the recommenda-
tion. For the legal arguments, the report 
should also include a statement of the legal 
questions presented and an analysis of the 
legal arguments. 
At trial, the legal father, who is the mov-
ing party, has the burden of proving why 
it is in the child's best interest to reopen and 
vacate the paternity decree. Depending on 
your recommendatiol\ you might be allied 
with the legal father or you might oppose 
his position. In any event, you will support 
your recommendation to the court through 
>vitness testimony, documentary evidence, 
and legal argument. 
Conclusion 
Requests to reopen paternity decrees 
are being filed with increasing frequency. 
These cases should not go forward with-
out counsel being appointed to represent 
the children whose paternity is being 
challenged. eft, 
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